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Scrooge and intellectual property rights
A medical prize fund could improve the financing of drug innovations
At Christmas, we traditionally retell Dickens’sstory of Scrooge, who cared more for moneythan for his fellow human beings. What would
we think of a Scrooge who could cure diseases that
blighted thousands of people’s lives but did not do so?
Clearly, we would be horrified. But this has increasingly
been happening in the name of economics, under the
innocent sounding guise of “intellectual property
rights.”
Intellectual property differs from other property—
restricting its use is inefficient as it costs nothing for
another person to use it. Thomas Jefferson, America’s
third president, put it more poetically than modern
economists (who refer to “zero marginal costs” and
“non-rivalrous consumption”) when he said that
knowledge is like a candle, when one candle lights
another it does not diminish from the light of the first.
Using knowledge to help someone does not prevent
that knowledge from helping others. Intellectual prop-
erty rights, however, enable one person or company to
have exclusive control of the use of a particular piece of
knowledge, thereby creating monopoly power.
Monopolies distort the economy. Restricting the use of
medical knowledge not only affects economic effi-
ciency, but also life itself.
We tolerate such restrictions in the belief that
they might spur innovation, balancing costs against
benefits. But the costs of restrictions can outweigh the
benefits. It is hard to see how the patent issued by the
US government for the healing properties of
turmeric, which had been known for hundreds of
years, stimulated research. Had the patent been
enforced in India, poor people who wanted to use this
compound would have had to pay royalties to the
United States.
In 1995 the Uruguay round trade negotiations
concluded in the establishment of the World Trade
Organization, which imposed US style intellectual
property rights around the world. These rights were
intended to reduce access to generic medicines and
they succeeded. As generic medicines cost a fraction of
their brand name counterparts, billions could no
longer afford the drugs they needed. For example, a
year’s treatment with a generic cocktail of AIDS drugs
might cost $130 (£65; €170) compared with $10 000
for the brand name version.1 Billions of people living
on $2-3 a day cannot afford $10 000, though they
might be able to scrape together enough for the
generic drugs. And matters are getting worse. New
drug regimens recommended by the World Health
Organization and second line defences that need to be
used as resistance to standard treatments develops can
cost much more.
Developing countries paid a high price for
this agreement. But what have they received in return?
Drug companies spend more on advertising and
marketing than on research, more on research on life-
style drugs than on life saving drugs, and almost
nothing on diseases that affect developing countries
only. This is not surprising. Poor people cannot afford
drugs, and drug companies make investments that
yield the highest returns. The chief executive of
Novartis, a drug company with a history of social
responsibility, said “We have no model which would
[meet] the need for new drugs in a sustainable way . . .
You can’t expect for-profit organizations to do this on
a large scale.”2
Research needs money, but the current sys-
tem results in limited funds being spent in the wrong
way. For instance, the human genome project decoded
the human genome within the target timeframe, but a
few scientists managed to beat the project so they
could patent genes related to breast cancer. The social
value of gaining this knowledge slightly earlier was
small, but the cost was enormous. Consequently the
cost of testing for breast cancer vulnerability genes is
high. In countries with no national health service
many women with these genes will fail to be tested. In
countries where governments will pay for these tests
less money will be available for other public health
needs.
A medical prize fund provides an alternative. Such
a fund would give large rewards for cures or vaccines
for diseases like malaria that affect millions, and
smaller rewards for drugs that are similar to existing
ones, with perhaps slightly different side effects. The
intellectual property would be available to generic
drug companies. The power of competitive markets
would ensure a wide distribution at the lowest possible
price, unlike the current system, which uses monopoly
power, with its high prices and limited usage.
The prizes could be funded by governments in
advanced industrial countries. For diseases that affect
the developed world, governments are already paying
as part of the health care they provide for their citizens.
For diseases that affect developing countries, the fund-
ing could be part of development assistance. Money
spent in this way might do as much to improve the
wellbeing of people in the developing world—and even
their productivity—as any other that they are given.
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The medical prize fund could be one of
several ways to promote innovation in crucial diseases.
The most important ideas that emerge from basic sci-
ence have never been protected by patents and never
should be. Most researchers are motivated by the
desire to enhance understanding and help human-
kind. Of course money is needed, and governments
must continue to provide money through research
grants along with support for government research
laboratories and research universities. The patent sys-
tem would continue to play a part for applications for
which no one offers a prize . The prize fund should
complement these other methods of funding; it at
least holds the promise that in the future more money
will be spent on research than on advertising and
marketing of drugs, and that research concentrates on
diseases that matter. Importantly, the medical prize
fund would ensure that we make the best possible use
of whatever knowledge we acquire, rather than hoard-
ing it and limiting usage to those who can afford it, as
Scrooge might have done. It is a thought we should
keep in mind this Christmas.3–6
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Shooting down the NHS reform track
Why ministers cannot pull the brake even if they want to
Anyone who wants to understand the process ofchange in England’s National Health Servicecould do worse than to summon up memories
of watching the bobsleigh events in the winter
Olympics. The bobsleigh riders hurtle down the icy
track at great speed. There is nothing they can do to
change direction. Their course and goal is determined
for them, and there is little they can do apart from
keeping their balance and their nerve as they round
the terrifying bends. If they were to brake suddenly,
regretting that they had ever got themselves involved
in such a high risk sport, disaster would strike.
The policy makers engaged in transforming the
NHS are in a similar position to those bobsleigh riders.
Once the government had decided on the new three
part model for the NHS, the course was set. In turn, the
logic of the model—competing providers, active
purchasers, and money following the patient—drives
policy, and allows for no deviation or delay. Moreover,
just like the bobsleigh riders, ministers are racing
against the clock. For the time being, extra billions are
flowing into the NHS at an unprecedented rate.
But the government’s commitment to this
increased rate of spending ends in 2008. Thereafter,
the annual increment in expenditure may be less gen-
erous, especially if the extra investment does not
produce commensurate improvements. So, in effect, a
deadline exists for the new model to show that it is
working—that ministerial rhetoric about greater
efficiency, improved responsiveness, and rising quality
is being turned into reality—and for the NHS to turn
into a political asset, not a political liability, for the gov-
ernment.
The government may well have stumbled into
devising the new model incrementally.1 But once
adopted, the model drives the adopters. Success for the
government depends on combining the elements of
competition, purchasing, and payment by results; delay
in introducing any element puts the whole model at
risk. This interdependence of the various strands of
policy explains the relentless pace of change, with min-
isters deaf to all pleas for adopting a less hectic pace for
fear of derailing the whole exercise. If competition is to
exist, private providers must be tempted to enter the
market, even if they have to be paid over the odds. For
active purchasing to occur, primary care trusts must be
strengthened through amalgamation, even if this
means adding to organisational disruption in the NHS.
If payment by results is to provide the dynamic for
greater efficiency and responsiveness, providers and
purchaser trusts must balance their books, even if this
leads to staffing cuts and painful service reconfigura-
tions.
The point about fiscal balance helps to explain the
past and has implications for the future. The NHS has
always been the envy of the world for its ability to con-
tain spending within the annual budgetary limits set by
the Treasury. But collective discipline went hand in
hand with individual indulgence. An opaque system of
loans and brokerage allowed some trusts to accumu-
late large year-on-year deficits, so smoothing out
turbulence and avoiding the political embarrassment
of painful cutbacks.
However, this system is incompatible with the new
model. If trusts are not required to stay within budget,
if they can be rescued when needed, where is the
incentive to be efficient and responsive? Which is why
a minor financial blip in 2005-6—which turned out to
be a deficit of £500m (€743m; $989m), the loose
change in a £75bn budget—produced disproportion-
ate shock waves and pain in the NHS as ministers
cranked up the pressure on trusts to balance their
books. Moreover, this will be the story of the NHS in
2007, even though its budget is rising to £82bn; the
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